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EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined an email from an attorney constituted a binding settlement agreement:

The email communications between plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ counsel sufficiently set forth an enforceable agreement to settle plaintiffs’ personal injury claims, including that of plaintiff Morales … . Plaintiffs’ counsel, who had authority to bind Morales, accepted defendants’ offer … . Furthermore, counsel typed his name at the end of the email accepting defendants’ offer, which satisfied CPLR 2104’s requirement that settlement agreements be in a “writing subscribed by him or his attorney” in order to be enforceable … , thus creating a binding settlement agreement. Jimenez v Yanne, 2017 NY Slip Op 05677, 1st Dept 7-13-17

CONTRACT LAW (SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT)/ATTORNEYS (SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT)/EMAILS (ATTORNEYS, SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT)/ATTORNEY (SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT)/SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (ATTORNEYS, EMAILS,  EMAIL FROM ATTORNEY CONSTITUTED A BINDING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, SUPREME COURT REVERSED 1ST DEPT)

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