UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT.

The Second Department that petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) was properly denied. Although petitioner’s application to participate in the prison’s nursery program was improperly denied and she and her child were subsequently admitted to the program by Supreme Court, the facts did not justify the award of attorneys’ fees:

In March 2015, the petitioner moved pursuant to the New York State Equal Access to Justice Act (CPLR art 86; hereinafter the EAJA) for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses. In an order dated August 31, 2015, the Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s motion on the grounds that the respondents’ decision to deny her application for admission to the Nursery Program was “substantially justified” and that “special circumstances make an award unjust” (CPLR 8601[a]). The petitioner appeals.

Under the EAJA, “a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust” (CPLR 8601[a]). An award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA is generally left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court … . “The determination of whether the State’s position was substantially justified is committed to the sound discretion of the court of first instance and is reviewable as an exercise of judicial discretion” … .

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in concluding that the respondents’ position was substantially justified, notwithstanding the court’s underlying conclusion that the respondents’ determination to deny the petitioner’s application for admission to the Nursery Program should be annulled … . In particular, the evidence in support of the respondents’ position would satisfy a reasonable person that it was not “desirable for the welfare of [the] child” to remain with the petitioner for purposes of the EAJA … . Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, although the court found that the respondents failed to consider certain factors, including the petitioner’s current achievements and the supervised nature of the Nursery Program, there was no evidence in the record that the respondents “willfully ignored” those factors. Moreover, this is not a case where the respondents failed to conduct any assessment as to whether the subject child’s welfare would best be served by remaining with the petitioner … . Matter of Losurdo v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 2017 NY Slip Op 05603, 2nd Dept 7-12-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/CORRECTIONS LAW (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/ATTORNEYS (EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)/EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (ATTORNEYS’ FEES, UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT, PETITIONER, AN INMATE WHO WAS INITIALLY DENIED ENTRY INTO A PRISON NURSERY PROGRAM FOR HER AND HER CHILD, WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS’ FEES FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE DENIAL 2ND DEPT)