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MIDTRIAL ORAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MADE AFTER THE PEOPLE BELATEDLY PROVIDED THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION, REQUIRED A HEARING; COURT’S SUA SPONTE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPROPER.

The Fourth Department determined the denial of defendant's midtrial motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant should not have been denied without a hearing. The search warrant application was not provided to the defense until after the trial had begun. The application indicated probable cause for the warrant was gained through a prior “security sweep” of the building:

In determining whether a hearing is required pursuant to CPL 710.60, “the sufficiency of defendant's factual allegations should be evaluated by (1) the face of the pleadings, (2) assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and (3) defendant's access to information” … . We note that the motion was not required to be made in writing, as would be required for a pretrial motion to suppress (see CPL 710.60 [1]) and, because it was properly “made orally in open court” during trial, the court was required, “where necessary, [to] conduct a hearing as provided in [CPL 710.60 (4)], out of the presence of the jury if any, and make findings of fact essential to the determination of the motion” (CPL 710.60 [5]).

We conclude that a hearing was necessary herein. Defendant's allegation that the search was of his home was sufficient “to demonstrate a personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises” … . * * * … [T]he People's current contention [that the sweep was justified by exigent circumstances] … ” raise[s] a factual dispute on a material point which must be resolved before the court can decide the legal issue' of whether evidence was obtained in a constitutionally permissible manner” … . Thus, before ruling on the motion, “it was incumbent upon [Supreme C]ourt to conduct a hearing to determine whether there were sufficient exigent circumstances [or other factors such as an ongoing emergency situation that would] justify the . . . warrantless entry” into the building … . Therefore, we hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for a hearing on defendant's midtrial suppression motion … . People v Samuel, 2016 NY Slip Op 02222, 4th Dept 3-25-16

CRIMINAL LAW (MIDTRIAL ORAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MADE AFTER THE PEOPLE BELATEDLY PROVIDED THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION, REQUIRED A HEARING; COURT'S SUA SPONTE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPROPER)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, MIDTRIAL ORAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MADE AFTER THE PEOPLE BELATEDLY PROVIDED THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION, REQUIRED A HEARING; COURT'S SUA SPONTE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPROPER)/SUPPRESSION (CRIMINAL LAW, MIDTRIAL ORAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MADE AFTER THE PEOPLE BELATEDLY PROVIDED THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION, REQUIRED A HEARING; COURT'S SUA SPONTE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPROPER)/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (MIDTRIAL ORAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS, MADE AFTER THE PEOPLE BELATEDLY PROVIDED THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION, REQUIRED A HEARING; COURT'S SUA SPONTE DENIAL OF THE MOTION WAS IMPROPER)

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