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REQUIREMENT THAT COVERAGE CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE GROUND FOR THE DENIAL IS SPECIFIED IN THE DISCLAIMER LETTER APPLIES ONLY TO DEATH AND BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, THE INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON A VANDALISM EXCLUSION IN THIS PROPERTY DAMAGE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant insurer’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. The policy contained an exclusion for fire caused by vandalism if the property had been vacant for 90 days. Plaintiffs acknowledged the property had been vacant for six months at the time of the fire, which was deemed to have been deliberately set. Supreme Court denied the motion pursuant to Insurance Law 3420 (d) which provides that coverage cannot be denied unless the ground for the denial is specified in the disclaimer letter. However, the Second Department noted that Insurance Law 3420 (d) only applies to death and bodily injury claims, not property damage claims:

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, Insurance Law § 3420(d) expressly applies only to claims involving death and bodily injury, and has no application to claims for property damage such as the one in the present case… . . Moreover, the defendant is not precluded from invoking the vandalism exclusion under the common-law principles of waiver or estoppel …, since the plaintiffs have adduced no evidence that the defendant intentionally relinquished its right to rely on that exclusion or lulled the plaintiffs into sleeping on their rights and thereby prejudiced them by its conduct … . Swanson v Allstate Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 04311, 2nd Dept 5-31-17

INSURANCE LAW (REQUIREMENT THAT COVERAGE CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE GROUND FOR THE DENIAL IS SPECIFIED IN THE DISCLAIMER LETTER APPLIES ONLY TO DEATH AND BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, THE INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON A VANDALISM EXCLUSION IN THIS PROPERTY DAMAGE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/DISCLAIMER LETTER (INSURANCE LAW, REQUIREMENT THAT COVERAGE CANNOT BE DENIED UNLESS THE GROUND FOR THE DENIAL IS SPECIFIED IN THE DISCLAIMER LETTER APPLIES ONLY TO DEATH AND BODILY INJURY CLAIMS, THE INSURER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON A VANDALISM EXCLUSION IN THIS PROPERTY DAMAGE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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