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SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the Sexual Assault Reform Act (Executive Law 258-c) (hereinafter SARA), as applied to the petitioner, was not shown to be so punitive in nature as to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Petitioner was convicted of a sex offense committed in 2000, before SARA was enacted. Upon release petitioner was deemed a Level One sex offender. SARA prohibits petitioner from living within 1000 feet of a school. In seeking a declaratory judgment/writ of prohibition finding SARA unconstitutional, petitioner argued the law virtually prohibits him from living and travelling in Brooklyn, where he had resided with his girlfriend:

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The issue of whether it is permissible to retroactively apply SARA, which became effective on February 1, 2001, after the petitioner had committed the underlying sex offense, turns upon whether such application would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law” … . The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to “penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them” … . “A statute will be considered an ex post facto law if it punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done,’ makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission,’ or deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed'”… . In contrast, a statute that is enacted for nonpunitive purposes, and is not so punitive in effect as to negate that nonpunitive intent, may be retroactively applied without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause … . * * *

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The legislative history of SARA as originally enacted in 2000, as well as that of its 2005 amendment, make clear that it was intended to provide protection to children from the risk of recidivism by certain convicted sex offenders, rather than to punish such offenders for a past crime… . Indeed, the Court of Appeals, in analyzing the issue of whether the State has preempted the field of managing registered sex offenders, has stressed that SARA was part of “a detailed and comprehensive regulatory scheme involving the State’s ongoing monitoring, management and treatment of registered sex offenders, which . . . does not end when the sex offender is released from prison” … . Moreover, the petitioner has not shown by the “clearest proof” that the residency and travel restrictions imposed by SARA, as applied to him, are so punitive in their consequences as to transform the restrictions into punishment … . Accordingly, the retroactive application of SARA does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause as applied to the petitioner. Since the petitioner failed to demonstrate “a clear legal right” to prohibition on that ground … , the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the petition/complaint. Matter of Devine v Annucci, 2017 NY Slip Op 04114, 2nd Dept 5-24-17

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (EX POST FACTO CLAUSE, SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/EX POST FACTO CLAUSE (SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/SEX OFFENDERS (SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)/SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT (SARA) SEXUAL ASSAULT REFORM ACT, WHICH PROHIBITED PETITIONER FROM LIVING AND TRAVELING WITHIN 1000 FEET OF A SCHOOL, AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SUFFICIENTLY PUNITIVE IN CHARACTER AS TO VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE)

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