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ABSENCE OF A COMMA, STANDING ALONE, WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DICTATE THE MEANING OF A CODE PROVISION.

The Second Department determined the absence of a comma from a code provision could not be the sole basis for an interpretation of its meaning. The code provision listed a number of activities that required a license:

That Code section provides, “No person shall . . . engage in . . . a home service business after January first two thousand thirteen . . . unless he [or she] is licensed therefore pursuant to this title.” Section 21-25.1(3) of the Code defines the term “home service.” It states, in part, that ” [h]ome service’ shall include, but not be limited to, repair, carpet and floor cleaning, installation of decorative goods, upholstery including repair and cleaning, . . . gutter cleaning, window cleaning, general cleaning, . . . roof and/or house washing, other than power washing and junk/debris/rubbish/estate cleanouts.” * * *

“[P]unctuation . . . is subordinate to the text and is never allowed to control its plain meaning, but when the meaning is not plain, resort may be had to those marks . . . in order to make the author’s meaning clear” … . “Punctuation may perhaps be resorted to when no other means can be found of solving an ambiguity, but not in cases where no real ambiguity exists except what punctuation itself creates” … . Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the plain meaning of section 21-25.1(3) is that those who are engaged in “junk/debris/rubbish/estate cleanouts” must be licensed, at least to the extent that they are currently engaged, or have been engaged in such business since January 1, 2013, in Nassau County.  Matter of Elenson v Nassau County, 2017 NY Slip Op 04116, 2nd Dept 5-24-17

 

STATUTES (ABSENCE OF A COMMA, STANDING ALONE, WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DICTATE THE MEANING OF A CODE PROVISION)/PUNCTUATION (STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, ABSENCE OF A COMMA, STANDING ALONE, WAS NOT ENOUGH TO DICTATE THE MEANING OF A CODE PROVISION)

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