You are here: / / PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PROPERTY TRANSFER TO HER BROTHER...
,

PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PROPERTY TRANSFER TO HER BROTHER BY HER MOTHER BASED UPON AN ALLEGATION MOTHER LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER, PLAINTIFF HAD ONLY A POTENTIAL, SPECULATIVE INTEREST IN HER MOTHER’S PROPERTY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not have standing to bring an action against her brother based upon allegations her brother, who had a power of attorney for their mother, had been unjustly enriched by the transfer of mother’s property to him:

​

The plaintiff, claiming that the mother lacked mental capacity at the time of the transfer, commenced this action against the defendant asserting causes of action to impose a constructive trust, to recover damages for unjust enrichment, for an accounting, and for “appointment of [a] guardian ad litem” for the mother. The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, asserting, among other things, that the plaintiff lacked standing. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

“[S]tanding requires an inquiry into whether the litigant has an interest in the claim at issue in the lawsuit that the law will recognize as a sufficient predicate for determining the issue at the litigant’s request'” … . Thus, to demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must “establish that he or she will actually be harmed by the challenged action, and that the injury is more than conjectural” … . “The rules governing standing help courts separate the tangible from the abstract or speculative injury” … .

Here, the defendant demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this action. “While [the] mother was alive, she had the absolute right to change her intentions regarding the distribution of her assets” … . Accordingly, the plaintiff’s interest in the subject real property and the mother’s other assets was merely a “potential, speculative interest,” insufficient to give rise to standing … . Jacob v Conway, 2017 NY Slip Op 03936, 2nd Dept 5-17-17

 

TRUSTS AND ESTATES (PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PROPERTY TRANSFER TO HER BROTHER BY HER MOTHER BASED UPON AN ALLEGATION MOTHER LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER, PLAINTIFF HAD ONLY A POTENTIAL, SPECULATIVE INTEREST IN HER MOTHER’S PROPERTY)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (STANDING, PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PROPERTY TRANSFER TO HER BROTHER BY HER MOTHER BASED UPON AN ALLEGATION MOTHER LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER, PLAINTIFF HAD ONLY A POTENTIAL, SPECULATIVE INTEREST IN HER MOTHER’S PROPERTY)/STANDING (TRUSTS AND ESTATES,  PLAINTIFF DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST PROPERTY TRANSFER TO HER BROTHER BY HER MOTHER BASED UPON AN ALLEGATION MOTHER LACKED MENTAL CAPACITY AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFER, PLAINTIFF HAD ONLY A POTENTIAL, SPECULATIVE INTEREST IN HER MOTHER’S PROPERTY)

You might also like
ALTHOUGH THE READY-FOR-TRIAL ANNOUNCEMENT WAS TIMELY, IT WAS ILLUSORY BECAUSE THE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS HAD NOT BEEN FILED; INDICTMENT PROPERLY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).
Improper Notice of Benefit Termination; Four-Month S/L Never Triggered; Termination Annulled
DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF PROOF OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NY CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, AS OPPOSED TO THE NY STATE HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH; PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NY CITY HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON A THEORY OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ISSUE A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT RE: WHETHER PLAINTIFF PHARMACY COULD SEEK PAYMENT OF PRESCRIPTIONS UNDER THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, EVEN THOUGH THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD (WCB) HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).
THE LABOR-LAW CONSTRUCTION-ACCIDENT ACTION WAS PRECLUDED BY THE RESULT OF THE PRIOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION HEARING UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL; THE MOTION TO AMEND THE ANSWER TO ADD THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DEFENSE WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, EVEN THOUGH THE MOTION WAS MADE AFTER THE NOTE OF ISSUE WAS FILED (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, RAISED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE, IF THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED IN THE PLEADINGS IT IS WAIVED, JUDGE CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IT (SECOND DEPT).
Supervision of Student Could Not Have Prevented Injury
PLAINTIFF DID NOT KNOW SOURCE OF FALLING WOOD WHICH STRUCK HIM, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE, AS MATTER OF LAW, A VIOLATION OF LABOR LAW 240(1).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

WATER DISTRICT’S CONSTRUCTION OF A REPLACEMENT DRINKING WATER SUPPLY TANK... TENANT ASSAULTED BY INTRUDER, QUESTIONS OF FACT ABOUT FORESEEABILITY, ADEQUACY...