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FAILURE TO TIE OFF LANYARD WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S FALL, ABSENCE OF A GUARDRAIL ON THE SCAFFOLD REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined plaintiff’s decedent was entitled to summary judgment on the Labor Law 240 (1) cause of action. The scaffold from which decedent fell did not have a building-side guardrail. Therefore, decedent’s failure to tie off a lanyard was not the sole proximate cause of the fall:

The motion court correctly granted plaintiff summary judgment on her Labor Law § 240(1) claim against Columbia (the building owner) and Bovis (the construction manager). It is uncontested that the scaffolding lacked a guardrail on the side adjacent to the window opening through which decedent fell… . Given this violation of the Labor Law, decedent’s alleged failure to tie his lanyard to the scaffold is not the sole proximate cause of his fall… . Wilk v Columbia Univ., 2017 NY Slip Op 03892, 1st Dept 5-16-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (FAILURE TO TIE OFF LANYARD WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S FALL, ABSENCE OF A GUARDRAIL ON THE SCAFFOLD REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION)/SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, FAILURE TO TIE OFF LANYARD WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S FALL, ABSENCE OF A GUARDRAIL ON THE SCAFFOLD REQUIRED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION)

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