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DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN CALL FROM HIS ATTORNEY CONCERNING WHETHER HE SHOULD SUBMIT TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, ARRESTING OFFICER DEEMED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSTITUTE A REFUSAL.

The Second Department determined the Department of Motor Vehicles’ finding that petitioner (driver) refused to submit to the chemical (blood alcohol) test after a vehicle stop must be annulled. Although the driver was warned that a refusal required the revocation of his license, he was not told that waiting for a return call from his attorney had been deemed a refusal by the arresting officer:

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A motorist under arrest based on an alleged violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 may not condition his or her consent to a chemical test on first being permitted to consult with counsel … . Nonetheless, the consequences of refusing to accede to a chemical test may be imposed only if the motorist, after being adequately warned of those consequences, has refused to accede to the test (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][b], [f]). The adequacy of the warning is the same for the consequence imposed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(b) (suspension and ultimate revocation of the motorist’s driver license) and the consequence imposed by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(f) (admissibility of evidence of refusal at a subsequent criminal trial) … . Here, the undisputed evidence at the hearing held pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(2)(c) failed to establish that the petitioner was warned that his time for deliberation had expired and his further request to consult with counsel, which the police sought to accommodate, would be deemed a refusal to accede to the chemical test … . We emphasize that our determination is not based on any violation of any purported right to counsel … , but on the adequacy of the warnings that the request to consult with counsel would constitute a refusal to accede to the chemical test … . Matter of Lamb v Egan, 2017 NY Slip Op 03751, 2nd Dept 5-10-17

CRIMINAL LAW (DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED, CHEMICAL TEST, DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN CALL FROM HIS ATTORNEY CONCERNING WHETHER HE SHOULD SUBMIT TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, ARRESTING OFFICER DEEMED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSTITUTE A REFUSAL)/VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW (DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED, CHEMICAL TEST, DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN CALL FROM HIS ATTORNEY CONCERNING WHETHER HE SHOULD SUBMIT TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, ARRESTING OFFICER DEEMED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSTITUTE A REFUSAL)/DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED (CHEMICAL TEST, REFUSAL, DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN CALL FROM HIS ATTORNEY CONCERNING WHETHER HE SHOULD SUBMIT TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, ARRESTING OFFICER DEEMED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSTITUTE A REFUSAL)/CHEMICAL TEST (DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED, REFUSAL, DRIVER WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF WAITING FOR A RETURN CALL FROM HIS ATTORNEY CONCERNING WHETHER HE SHOULD SUBMIT TO A BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST, ARRESTING OFFICER DEEMED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO CONSTITUTE A REFUSAL)

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