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RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a release referred only to claims arising from injuries suffered by defendant, and not injuries suffered by another:

In March 2013, third-party defendant John Salewski, while operating a tractor trailer owned by his employer and third-party defendant Werner Enterprises, Inc., was involved in a collision with a tractor trailer operated by defendant. Plaintiff is Salewski’s wife and was a passenger in the vehicle operated by Salewski at the time of the accident. Defendant commenced a personal injury action against Salewski and Werner for damages allegedly sustained in that accident. That action was settled in June 2014, and, in connection therewith, defendant executed a general release in favor of Salewski and Werner. In April 2015, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant for damages that she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. Defendant answered and thereafter commenced a third-party action for contribution and indemnification against Salewski and Werner. Instead of answering, Salewski and Werner moved to dismiss the third-party complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) on the ground of release. Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that the plain language of the release barred the third-party action. * * *

Here, the release clearly defines the incident, the claim and the lawsuit. The fact that there are multiple references to the term “injuries” indicates an unambiguous intention to limit the release’s application only to the personal injuries suffered by defendant in the incident. We further find this language to be a clear and unambiguous expression of the parties’ intention that the release applies only to claims related to defendant’s injuries. As such, and giving full meaning and effect to its material provisions, the release plainly manifests an intent to release Salewski and Werner for any and all claims related to defendant’s personal injuries, and not to claims for contribution and indemnification for injuries allegedly suffered by another party — here, plaintiff … . Salewski v Music, 2017 NY Slip Op 03582, 3rd Dept 5-5-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)/NEGLIGENCE (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)/RELEASES (RELEASE REFERRED ONLY TO INJURIES SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT AND THEREFORE DID NOT PRECLUDE A SUIT STEMMING FROM INJURIES TO ANOTHER)

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