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SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a concurrence and a two-justice dissent, determined the action by the respondent school district (re: terminating certain health insurance available to retirees) was not quasi-legislative. Therefore the four-month statute of limitations for petitioners’ Article 78 contesting the school district’s action did not start to run upon the mailing of the undated notification letter. The respondents, therefore, did not demonstrate the Article 78 proceeding was barred by the statute of limitations:

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A quasi-legislative-type administrative determination is one having an impact far beyond the immediate parties at the administrative stage… . Thus, where a quasi-legislative determination is challenged, “actual notice of the challenged determination is not required in order to start the statute of limitations clock” … . The policy underlying the rule is that actual notice to the general public is not practicable … . Instead, the statute of limitations begins to run once the administrative agency’s quasi-legislative determination of the issue becomes “readily ascertainable” to the complaining party… .

On the other hand, where the public at large is not impacted by a determination, actual notice, commonly in the form of receipt of a letter or other writing containing the final and binding determination, is required to commence the statute of limitations … . * * *

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… [I]nasmuch as respondents, in our view, failed to meet their burden to establish when the four-month statute of limitations commenced, the burden did not shift to petitioners to establish any particular date of individual receipt of the undated letter. In any event, respondents failed to establish any dates of receipt by petitioners in their moving papers. Matter of Knavel v West Seneca Cent. Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 03416, 4th Dept 4-28-17

 

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION)/QUASI-LEGISLATIVE ACTION (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (ARTICLE 78, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION)/ARTICLE 78 (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, (SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION)/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (ARTICLE 78, SCHOOL DISTRICT’S TERMINATION OF A CERTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE OPTION FOR RETIREES WAS NOT QUASI-LEGISLATIVE, THEREFORE MAILING THE NOTIFICATION LETTER DID NOT TRIGGER THE FOUR-MONTH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR AN ARTICLE 78 CONTESTING THE ACTION)

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