You are here: / / 15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE P...

15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS.

The First Department determined the 15-month delay in holding respondent sex-offender’s Article 10 trial did not deprive him of due process. The court explained that the statutory 60-day time limit for holding the trial did not require dismissal of the petition and further explained and applied the four-point due process analysis:

​

The 60-day deadline by which a trial “shall” be commenced, pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07(a), is not a “strict time limit[]” … . As there is no clear legislative intent to make compliance with that time frame a prerequisite to continued jurisdiction … , the failure to commence a trial within 60 days does not mandate dismissal of the petition … . Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) states repeatedly that failure to comply with various deadlines does not affect the validity of the petition or the various actions subject to those deadlines … . …

​

Respondent’s due process rights were not violated by the 15-month delay between his declaration of readiness for trial, after the probable cause determination, made upon his waiver of a probable cause hearing, and the start of the trial. Under the four-factor balancing test set forth in Barker v Wingo (407 US 514 [1972] … , the length of the delay may be considered presumptively prejudicial … . The second factor, the reason given for the delay (id. at 531), weighs only slightly against petitioner, because a considerable portion of the delay is attributable to respondent, the unavailability of the experts, and circumstances beyond petitioner’s control. …

The third Barker factor, respondent’s assertion of his rights (407 US at 531-532), weighs in respondent’s favor with respect to those adjournments to which he objected. However, his failure to retain any experts for, or to testify in, the article 10 proceedings, his consent to delays, his refusal to appear in court twice, and his engagement in abusive conduct directed against those associated with the proceeding suggest that respondent “did not desire an early judicial hearing” … . …

​

The fourth Barker factor, prejudice to respondent (407 US 532), weighs in petitioner’s favor. There was no oppressive pretrial incarceration, since respondent chose to be confined at Rikers Island, rather than at a secure mental health facility, during the proceedings … , and respondent’s ability to put on a defense was not affected by the delay. Matter of State of New York v Keith F., 2017 NY Slip Op 03276, 1st Dept 4-27-17

 

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW (SEX OFFENDERS, 15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS)/SEX OFFENDERS (MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, 15 MONTH DELAY IN ARTICLE 10 TRIAL DID NOT DEPRIVE RESPONDENT OF DUE PROCESS)

You might also like
SILENCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE WAIVER; HERE THE NONPARTY DID NOT EXPRESSLY WAIVE THE COMMON INTEREST, WORK PRODUCT OR TRIAL PREPARATION PRIVILEGES WITH RESPECT TO SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS (FIRST DEPT).
POLICE OFFICER WAS RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY AND WAS NOT ACTING IN RECKLESS DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF OTHERS WHEN THE POLICE CAR STRUCK PLAINTIFF WHO WAS STANDING IN THE ROAD, COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT). 
POLICE DID NOT NOTICE SIGNS OF INTOXICATION UNTIL AFTER DEFENDANT WAS STOPPED AND SEIZED, MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
THE ALLEGATION THE LEAD CAR STOPPED SUDDENLY NOT ENOUGHT TO DEFEAT LEAD CAR’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION.
PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS TRUCK-BICYCLE COLLISION CASE; THE TRUCK DRIVER BREACHED HIS DUTY TO SEE WHAT SHOULD BE SEEN (FIRST DEPT).
AT SENTENCING THE PROSECUTOR REFERENCED EXCULPATORY STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO DEFENDANT IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT BUT, WHEN GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY, NEITHER DEFENDANT NOR DEFENSE COUNSEL ADDRESSED THE ISSUE; NOTWITHSTANDING THE SILENCE OF THE DEFENSE THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INQUIRED INTO WHETHER THE GUILTY PLEA WAS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY; THERE WAS NO NEED TO PRESERVE THE ERROR FOR APPEAL (FIRST DEPT).
INDICTMENT COUNT CHARGING 20 INDIVIDUAL INSTANCES OF CONTEMPT WAS DUPLICITOUS, CONVICTION REVERSED (FIRST DEPT).
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WHEN IT BECAME VACANT DID NOT VIOLATE THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES; ALTHOUGH THE TENANT IN THE UNIT WAS NOT NAMED, REFERENCE TO THE TENANCY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPLY A “LIFE IN BEING” (FIRST DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

EXCLUSION OF INJURY FROM ASSAULT CONTROLLED, NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION STEMMING... LOSS OF TRANSCRIPT OF LAST DAY OF BENCH TRIAL AND SENTENCING DID NOT PRECLUDE...