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RETRIAL VIOLATED THE PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY; DEFENDANT HAD MADE A MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL WITH PREJUDICE AND DID NOT CONSENT TO THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction in the retrial and dismissing the indictment, determined the trial court’s failure to procure defendant’s consent to discharge the jury after defendant’s motion for a mistrial with prejudice triggered the protection against double jeopardy:

Double jeopardy bars a retrial except as to a defendant who has requested or consented to the mistrial … . Here, the record does not show that either defendant consented to a mistrial without prejudice. Defendants initially made general motions for a mistrial, but on the next day they expressly limited their motions to requests for a mistrial with prejudice. Accordingly, when the court announced its ruling shortly afterwards, it should have obtained defendants’ unequivocal consent before discharging the first jury or else have continued the trial with the same jury … . The retrial thus violated the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, and these prohibitions require reversal of defendants’ convictions and dismissal of the indictment … . Defendants’ double jeopardy claim does not require preservation, although it may be expressly waived … . However, there was no such waiver here. People v Lantigua, 2021 NY Slip Op 05671, First Dept 10-19-21

 

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