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IN THIS RESIDENTIAL-MORTGAGE-BACKED-SECURITIES BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION, THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING THE “BORROWING STATUTE” (STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS) DEFENSE IN AN AMENDED ANSWER SERVED AS OF RIGHT (WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT); LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH (FIRST DEPT). ​

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Gische, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that the amended answer with counterclaims, alleging for the first time that the action was untimely under the borrowing statute (CPLR 202), was properly served “as of right” (without leave of court) and the inclusion of the borrowing statute defense was not barred by the law of the case doctrine (LOTC). The opinion includes an in-depth discussion of the LOTC. The opinion rejected the arguments that certain contract provisions were conditions precedent as opposed to independent contractual obligations and certain breach of contract claims were really claims for indemnification. All of the contracts stem from residential-mortgage-backed-securities and obligations to cover losses from the alleged breach of “representations and warranties” concerning the underlying mortgages. With regard to the LOTC, the court wrote:

The doctrine of LOTC is a rule of practice premised upon sound policy that once an issue is judicially determined, further litigation of that issue should be precluded in a particular case … . It ends the matter as far as judges and courts of coordinate jurisdiction are concerned … . While it shares some characteristics of a larger family of kindred concepts, including res judicata and collateral estoppel, it is not identical … . All these concepts contemplate that the party opposing preclusion had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the underlying determination. LOTC, however, differs in that it only addresses the potentially preclusive effect of judicial determinations made during a single litigation and before a final judgment is rendered … . In addition, while res judicata and collateral estoppel are “rigid rules of limitation,” LOTC has been described as “amorphous” and involving “an element of discretion” … . Discretion, however, is circumscribed where the decision providing the basis for LOTC is by an appellate court. Thus, while LOTC cannot bind an appellate court to a trial court ruling … , it does bind a trial court (and subsequent appellate courts of coordinate jurisdiction) to follow the mandate of an appellate court, absent new evidence or a change in the law … . Matter of Part 60 RMBS Put – Back Litig., 2021 NY Slip Op 02252, First Dept 4-13-21

 

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THE CONTRACT WAS BETWEEN CORPORATIONS IN DIFFERENT STATES, THEREFORE INTERSTATE... THE PROPERTY OWNER WAS NOT LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR;...