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NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION.

The First Department determined New York law applied here where plaintiff and plaintiff’s employer, Nygard, a third-party defendant, are Canadian and further held plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 241(6) cause of action. Plaintiff was shocked by electric wires which were on the floor of the workplace:

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To the extent, if any, Manitoba law, unlike New York law, might prohibit the third-party claims asserted by defendants (both domiciled in New York) against Manitoba-domiciliary Nygard, plaintiff’s employer, the availability of a third-party claim against plaintiff’s employer is governed by the law of the place of injury — here, New York — “where the local law of each litigant’s domicile favors that party, and the action is pending in one of those jurisdictions” … . The application of New York law on this issue is appropriate because this state, where the accident occurred, “is the place with which both [defendants and Nygard] have voluntarily associated themselves” … , and “comports with the reasonable expectations of [these] parties in conducting their business affairs” … .

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Plaintiff was engaged in “construction” work at the time of the incident (Labor Law § 241[6]), and Owner’s attempt to isolate the activities in which plaintiff was involved at the moment of the incident ignores the general context of the work … . Further, the record established a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.13(b)(4), which requires that workers who may come into contact with an electric power circuit be protected against electric shock “by de-energizing the circuit and grounding it or by guarding such circuit by effective insulation or other means.” That plaintiff was electrically shocked, as confirmed by another Nygard International employee, demonstrated that the circuit was not de-energized, grounded, or guarded by effective insulation. Plaintiff also established that the violation of the provision was a result of negligence … . Owner’s contention that an issue of fact exists as to plaintiff’s comparative negligence is unavailing. Plaintiff testified that he had objected to having the temporary lighting work performed in the manner that it was done, and that Nygard International’s principal overruled him. The principal’s insistence that plaintiff perform the temporary wiring work, despite plaintiff’s objections, established negligence by Nygard, for which Owner is vicariously liable … . O’Leary v S&A Elec. Contr. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 02888, 1st Dept 4-13-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE  (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)/CHOICE OF LAW (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, (NEW YORK LAW APPLIED WHERE BOTH PLAINTIFF AND HIS EMPLOYER ARE CANADIAN, PLAINTIFF, WHO WAS SHOCKED BY ELECTRIC WIRES ON THE FLOOR, ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION)

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