You are here: / / LENDER DID NOT NEGOTIATE A MORTGAGE MODIFICATION IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS...
,

LENDER DID NOT NEGOTIATE A MORTGAGE MODIFICATION IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS PROPERLY SANCTIONED.

The Second Department determined plaintiff-lender did not negotiate a mortgage modification in good faith and was properly sanctioned by the tolling of interest, costs and attorney’s fees accrued during the four years of negotiations:

Pursuant to CPLR 3408(f), the parties at a mandatory foreclosure settlement conference are required to negotiate in good faith to reach a mutually agreeable resolution … . “The purpose of the good faith requirement . . . is to ensure that both plaintiff and defendant are prepared to participate in a meaningful effort at the settlement conference to reach resolution” … . Compliance with the good faith requirement is measured by the totality of the circumstances and whether the party’s conduct demonstrates a meaningful effort at reaching a resolution … .

Here, the totality of the circumstances supports the finding that the plaintiff failed to negotiate in good faith. The hearing evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff, among other things, engaged in dilatory conduct by making piecemeal document requests, providing contradictory information, and repeatedly requesting documents that had already been provided … . Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Diakite, 2017 NY Slip Op 01528, 2nd Dept 3-1-17

 

FORECLOSURE (LENDER DID NOT NEGOTIATE A MORTGAGE MODIFICATION IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS PROPERLY SANCTION)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (FORECLOSURE, LENDER DID NOT NEGOTIATE A MORTGAGE MODIFICATION IN GOOD FAITH AND WAS PROPERLY SANCTION)

You might also like
A Phone Call, Even When Reduced to Writing, Does Not Satisfy the City’s “Written Notice of a Defect” Requirement
THE DAY CARE PROVIDER TESTIFIED HER BACK WAS TURNED WHEN INFANT PLAINTIFF FELL OFF THE SLIDE; THE DAY CARE CENTER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE NEGLIGENT-SUPERVISION CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH DEFENDANT DRIVER HAD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AND PLAINTIFF APPARENTLY PULLED OUT OF A DRIVEWAY IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF RAISED A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT KEPT A PROPER LOOKOUT (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE REFEREE DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE ORDER OF REFERENCE; SUPREME COURT’S RULINGS BASED UPON THE REFEREE’S ORDER WERE THEREFORE INVALID (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF ALLEGEDLY TRIPPED OVER CONSTRUCTION DEBRIS IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 241 (6) ACTION, INDEMNIFICATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE FREE FROM NEGLIGENCE, BUT THE CONTRIBUTION CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY SURVIVED, CRITERIA FOR INDEMNIFICATION AND CONTRIBUTION EXPLAINED IN SOME DEPTH (SECOND DEPT).
INSURANCE AGENCY ALLEGED FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE INSURED WHICH RESULTED IN A LOWER PREMIUM, THE COMPLAINT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED A FRAUD CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK’S ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THIS BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ABSENT PROOF OF THE ATTORNEY’S EXPERIENCE AND ABILITIES AND THE NATURE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE CONTRACTOR HIRED TO WORK ON A SIDEWALK WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING SURE PEDESTRIANS HAD A SAFE PASSAGEWAY; PLAINTIFFS WERE STRUCK BY A CAR WHEN THEY WALKED IN THE PUBLIC STREET BECAUSE THE SIDEWALK WAS BLOCKED; THE THEORY OF LIABILITY APPEARS TO STEM FROM THE CONTRACTOR’S ALLEGED CREATION OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION UPON A PUBLIC STREET OR SIDEWALK (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

INSUFFICIENT INQUIRY INTO SEX OFFENDER’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF... EVEN AN INNOCENT MATERIAL MISTAKE ON AN INSURANCE APPLICATION RENDERS THE POLICY...