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Denial of Special Use Permit Reversed As Arbitrary and Capricious/Difference Between Special Use Permit and Use Variance Explained

The Second Department determined that the denial of 7-Eleven’s petition for a special exception (also referred to as a special use permit) for operation of a convenience store was arbitrary and capricious.  The court explained the difference between a special use permit and a use variance. A special use permit gives a property owner permission to use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning ordinance but not necessarily allowed as of right. A use variance gives the owner permission to use the property in a manner inconsistent with the zoning ordinance.  The proof burden is much lighter for a special use permit, as opposed to a use variance.  The proponent of a special use permit need only show compliance with legislatively imposed conditions, while the proponent of a use variance must show undue hardship in complying with the ordinance. Here no evidence was presented to support the denial of the special use permit:

A special exception, commonly known as a special use permit, “gives [a property owner] permission to use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning ordinance, although not necessarily allowed as of right” … . By contrast, a use variance gives a property owner permission to use the property in a manner inconsistent with a local zoning ordinance. “The significance of this distinction is that the inclusion of the permitted use in the ordinance is tantamount to a legislative finding that the permitted use is in harmony with the general zoning plan and will not adversely affect the neighborhood” … . Accordingly, “the burden of proof on an owner seeking a special exception is lighter than that on an owner seeking a [use] variance, the former only being required to show compliance with any legislatively imposed conditions on an otherwise permitted use, while the latter must show an undue hardship in complying with the ordinance” … . Matter of 7-Eleven, Inc. v Incorporated Vil. of Mineola, 2015 NY Slip Op 03544, 2nd Dept 4-29-15

 

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