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UNAMBIGUOUS TERM OF INSURANCE CONTRACT CAPPING PAYMENT FOR WATER DAMAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, over a two-justice dissent, determined the terms of the insurance policy were not ambiguous and the $25,000 cap for water damage applied:

It is well-settled that insurance contracts are construed “in light of common speech’ and the reasonable expectations of a businessperson” … . “[U]nambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning” … . We conclude that the contract language at issue here is not ambiguous. By its plain terms, the contract limits coverage to $25,000 for damage caused when ground water enters the basement through a gap, hole, or opening in the wall, and the conduit clearly falls within the water damage exclusion and endorsement … . Papa v Associated Indem. Corp., 2017 NY Slip Op 01118, 4th Dept 2-10-17

INSURANCE LAW (UNAMBIGUOUS TERM OF INSURANCE CONTRACT CAPPING PAYMENT FOR WATER DAMAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED)/CONTRACT LAW (iNSURANCE LAW, UNAMBIGUOUS TERM OF INSURANCE CONTRACT CAPPING PAYMENT FOR WATER DAMAGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ENFORCED)

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