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THE PARTY WHO BROUGHT THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION WAS NOT A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEDENT’S ESTATE AND THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE STANDING; BECAUSE THE PARTY HAD NO RIGHT TO SUE, “SUBSTITUTION” OF THE EXECUTORS FOR THAT PARTY WAS NOT AVAILABLE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined (1) plaintiffs’ cross-motion to substitute the executors of decedent’s estate for plaintiffs should not have been granted, and (2) defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing should have been granted. The plaintiff who purportedly brought the wrongful death action (a “proposed” executor) was not a “personal representative” under the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL). Therefore, “substitution” of the executors for the plaintiff was not possible:

… [A]s a “[p]roposed” executor who had not obtained letters to administer decedent’s estate, plaintiff was not a personal representative within the meaning of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law at the time the action was commenced and thus did not have standing to commence an action on behalf of decedent’s estate … . Thus, we agree with defendants that Supreme Court erred in granting plaintiff’s cross-motion to substitute as plaintiffs the executors of decedent’s estate inasmuch as “[s]ubstitution . . . is not an available mechanism for replacing a party . . . who had no right to sue with one who has such a right” … .

We … agree with defendants that the court erred in denying that part of their motion seeking to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was brought by a party without standing … . Cappola v Tennyson Ct., 2024 NY Slip Op 04672, Fourth Dept 9-27-24

Practice Point: Only a “personal representative” of a decedent’s estate has standing to sue on behalf of the decedent  Here the suit was brought by a party who had not obtained letters to administer the estate and therefore did not have standing. “Substitution” of the executors for a party without standing is not possible.

 

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