You are here: / / DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DETERMINATION WITHOUT A HEARING IN THIS...
,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DETERMINATION WITHOUT A HEARING IN THIS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATTER WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND HAD A RATIONAL BASIS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE DETERMINATION.

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the New York State Department of Human Rights’ (SDHR’s) ruling, without a hearing, there was no probable cause to believe petitioner was discriminated or retaliated against because of her disability was not arbitrary or capricious and had a rational basis:

“Where, as here, SDHR renders a determination of no probable cause without holding a hearing, the appropriate standard of review is whether the probable cause determination was arbitrary and capricious or lacked a rational basis’ ” … . We agree with respondent that the court erred in disturbing SDHR’s determination based upon, inter alia, its failure to conduct a hearing. “Courts give deference to SDHR due to its experience and expertise in evaluating allegations of discrimination” … , and “such deference extends to [SDHR’s] decision whether to conduct a hearing” … . SDHR has the discretion to determine the method to be used in investigating a claim, and “a hearing is not required in all cases” … . Inasmuch as “the parties made extensive submissions to [SDHR], petitioner was given an opportunity to present [her] case, and the record shows that the submissions were in fact considered, the determination cannot be arbitrary and capricious merely because no hearing was held’ … . * * *

Here, we conclude that “the conflicting evidence before SDHR did not create a material issue of fact that warranted a formal hearing” … . Rather, we agree with respondent that a rational basis supports SDHR’s determination that, based upon all of the facts and circumstances, there is no factual basis in the evidence sufficient to warrant a cautious person to believe that respondent unlawfully discriminated against petitioner based on her disability ,,, . In addition, SDHR rationally determined that the evidence did not support petitioner’s allegation that respondent subjected her to a hostile work environment … . Finally, we conclude that SDHR’s determination that there was no probable cause to believe that respondent retaliated against petitioner is not arbitrary or capricious, and it has a rational basis in the record … . Matter of McDonald v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2017 NY Slip Op 01060, 4th Dept 2-10-17

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DETERMINATION WITHOUT A HEARING IN THIS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATTER WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND HAD A RATIONAL BASIS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE DETERMINATION)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (NYS) (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DETERMINATION WITHOUT A HEARING IN THIS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATTER WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND HAD A RATIONAL BASIS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE DETERMINATION)/DISABILITIES (EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ DETERMINATION WITHOUT A HEARING IN THIS DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATTER WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS AND HAD A RATIONAL BASIS, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ANNULLED THE DETERMINATION)

You might also like
TRAFFIC CONCERNS JUSTIFIED THE ZONING BOARD’S RESTRICTIONS ON A RESTAURANT’S HOURS OF OPERATION AND REQUIREMENT FOR VALET PARKING (FOURTH DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE POLICE IN THIS STREET STOP CASE MAY HAVE HAD CAUSE FOR A LEVEL ONE INQUIRY (A CAN IN A PAPER BAG), THEY IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED IN LEVEL TWO INVASIVE QUESTIONING FOCUSED ON DEFENDANT’S POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE OPEN CONTAINER LAW; DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE ERRONEOUS “LOSS OF CHANCE” JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRED REVERSAL; THE CHARGE USED THE PHRASES “SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR” AND “SUBSTANTIAL PROBABILITY” WHEN THE CORRECT PHRASE IS “SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY” IN REFERENCE TO WHETHER A BETTER OUTCOME WAS DENIED DUE TO A DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE (FOURTH DEPT).
THE JUDGE SUMMARILY DENIED DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF WITHOUT CONDUCTING THE MANDATORY “SEARCHING INQUIRY;” NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FOURTH DEPT).
New Relicensing Regulations Can Be Applied Retroactively (Re: Alcohol-Related Driving Convictions)
Petitioner Did Not Have Standing to Contest Negative SEQRA Finding/”Alienation of Parkland” and “Public Trust” Arguments Rejected
Purchase of Life Estate Considered Transfer of Property Requiring Delay of Medicaid Eligibility
Motion to Quash Subpoena for Billing Records Re: the Insurance Company’s Examining Physician Properly Denied

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

GLAZIERS ENROLLED IN AN APPRENTICE PROGRAM SHOULD BE PAID AS APPRENTICES EVEN... UNAMBIGUOUS TERM OF INSURANCE CONTRACT CAPPING PAYMENT FOR WATER DAMAGE SHOULD...