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CORRIDOR FORMED BY LUMBER AND MATERIALS PILED ON EITHER SIDE WAS A PASSAGEWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, DEFENDANT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6).

The Second Department determined a two to three-foot wide corridor created by lumber and materials piled on either side was a “passageway” within the meaning to the industrial code. Plaintiff was injured when he tripped while carrying materials along the corridor. The Court of Claims properly found defendant liable under Labor Law 241 (6):

The claimant filed a claim pursuant to Labor Law § 241(6) alleging a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7(e)(1), which provides in relevant part that “[a]ll passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping.” …

“Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers” … . “In order to recover damages on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff must establish the violation of an Industrial Code provision which sets forth specific safety standards” … . To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff or a claimant must demonstrate that his injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case … . Contributory and comparative negligence are valid defenses to a Labor Law § 241(6) claim … . Aragona v State of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00954, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (CORRIDOR FORMED BY LUMBER AND MATERIALS PILED ON EITHER SIDE WAS A PASSAGEWAY WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE INDUSTRIAL CODE, DEFENDANT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 241 (6))

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