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Criteria for Piercing the Corporate Veil Explained/Appellate Review Powers Re: a Bench Trial Described

The Second Department determined Supreme Court (in a bench trial) had properly pierced the corporate veil to find the owner personally liable.  The court described the criteria for piercing the corporate veil and noted that, in reviewing a bench trial, the appellate court has the same fact-finding powers as the trial court:

“In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses” … .

“The general rule . . . is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability” … . The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, allowing the imposition of individual liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation “to prevent fraud or to achieve equity” … . “A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over it in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff” … . AZTE Inc v Auto Collection Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 00711, 2nd Dept 1–28-15

 

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