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SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS, CRITERIA EXPLAINED.

The Fourth Department determined there was no basis for the award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendants in this deed/adverse possession action. After two appeals and a trial, the defendants prevailed:

We agree with plaintiff that Supreme Court improperly awarded counsel fees and litigation costs to defendants, and we therefore reverse. The general rule in New York is that litigants are required to absorb their own counsel fees and litigation costs unless there is a contractual or statutory basis for imposing them … , and “[t]here is neither a contractual nor a statutory basis for the award of [counsel] fees to [defendants] in this case” … . Furthermore, although a court may award counsel fees as a sanction for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, it may do so “only upon a written decision setting forth the conduct on which the award . . . is based, the reasons why the court found the conduct to be frivolous, and the reasons why the court found the amount awarded . . . to be appropriate” (22 NYCRR 130-1.2…). Here, defendants did not seek sanctions for frivolous conduct, and the court did not issue a written decision or make any finding that plaintiff or decedents engaged in such conduct. Furthermore, we conclude that the counterclaim seeking to recover counsel fees failed to state a cause of action inasmuch as defendants did not allege any proper basis upon which such fees would be recoverable. We therefore dismiss the counterclaims … . Perry v Edwards, 2017 NY Slip Op 00862, 4th Dept 2-3-17

ATTORNEYS (FEES, SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS)/ATTORNEYS FEES (SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE AWARDED ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS TO PREVAILING DEFENDANTS)

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