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HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS).

The Third Department determined defendant insurer (homeowners policies) had a duty to defend plaintiff in an action brought by one Prindle, who was shot by plaintiff. The shooting could have been unintentional and therefore covered under the policy:

An insurance company’s duty to defend “is exceedingly broad and an insurer will be called upon to provide a defense whenever the allegations of the complaint suggest a reasonable possibility of coverage” … . If the complaint’s allegations bring the claim “even potentially within the embrace of the policy, the insurer must defend its insured no matter how groundless, false or baseless the suit may be” … . …

Here, Prindle’s complaint alleged that plaintiff “assault[ed] [Prindle] . . . by shooting [Prindle] in the abdomen” and that “as a result of the assault,” Prindle sustained personal injuries. While Prindle’s complaint also alleged that plaintiff was arrested and criminally charged with assault, there was no further specification as to this criminal charge raised against plaintiff … . Inasmuch as an assault may derive from an individual’s recklessness or criminal negligence (see Penal Law § 120.00 [2], [3]), a reasonable possibility exists that plaintiff’s actions were not intentional, as defendant argues … . …

Because the shooting can be reasonably interpreted as having stemmed from plaintiff’s unintentional conduct, we conclude that defendant’s duty to defend was triggered under the insurance policy … . Guzy v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2017 NY Slip Op 00233, 3rd Dept 1-12-17

 

INSURANCE LAW (HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/DUTY TO DEFEND (INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/ASSAULT (INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))/SHOOTING (ASSAULT, INSURANCE LAW, HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY HAD DUTY TO DEFEND IN AN ACTION STEMMING FROM A SHOOTING BY THE INSURED, SHOOTING MAY HAVE BEEN UNINTENTIONAL (RECKLESS))

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