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HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined plaintiff’s Labor Law 240(1) cause of action was properly dismissed. Plaintiff was working in the basement when a pipe, which was one foot above him and was within his reach, fell and injured him. The majority found the height differential “de minimus” and therefore not actionable:

“Liability may . . . be imposed under [Labor Law § 240 (1)] only where the plaintiff’s injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential’ ” … . Although there is conflicting deposition testimony concerning the exact elevation of the pipe, it is undisputed that the pipe was, at most, one foot above plaintiff’s head, and that the pipe was always within his reach. We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s injury did not fall within the scope of section 240 (1) inasmuch as “any height differential between plaintiff and the [pipe] that fell on him was de minimis” … . Kuhn v Giovanniello, 2016 NY Slip Op 08633, 4th Dept 12-23-16

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)/DE MINIMUS (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)/HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (HEIGHT DIFFERENTIAL DEEMED DE MINIMUS AND NOT ACTIONABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240(1), PIPE WHICH FELL WAS ONE FOOT ABOVE PLAINTIFF’S HEAD AND WITHIN HIS REACH)

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