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PLAINTIFFS HAD STANDING TO BRING A COMMON-LAW ACTION TO ENJOIN ZONING VIOLATIONS BY VIRTUE OF THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ AND DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTIES.

The Second Department determined plaintiffs had standing to bring a private common-law action to enjoin zoning violations by virtue of the proximity of plaintiffs’ property to defendants’ property:

 

“To establish standing to maintain a private common-law action to enjoin zoning violations, a private plaintiff must establish that, due to the defendant’s activities, he or she will sustain special damages that are different in kind and degree from the community generally’ and that the asserted interests fall within the zone of interest to be protected’ by the statute or ordinance at issue” … . However, “an allegation of close proximity may give rise to an inference of injury enabling a nearby property owner to maintain an action without proof of actual injury” … . Here, the record demonstrates that the plaintiffs’ property was in close proximity to the defendants’ property and that the plaintiffs’ interests “were within the zone of interest to be protected by the zoning ordinances alleged to be violated” … . Since the appellant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain this action, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3)… . Gershon v Cunninghaml, 2016 NY Slip Op 00332, 2nd Dept 1-20-16

 

ZONING (STANDING FOR PRIVATE COMMON-LAW ACTION TO ENJOIN ZONING VIOLATIONS)/STANDING (PRIVATE COMMON-LAW ACTION TO ENJOIN ZONING VIOLATIONS)

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