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PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO CONSTRUCTION ON PARK LAND.

The Second Department determined petitioners did not have standing to object to the construction of a water purification facility, called an “air stripper” on park land. The petitioners alleged they frequented the park and the natural setting would be destroyed by the air stripper. Standing under the State Environmental Quality Review Act  (SEQRA) is demonstrated by injury which is different from any injury suffered by the public at large:

“To establish standing under SEQRA, a petitioner must show (1) an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” … . “[I]n land-use and environmental cases, a person who can prove that he or she uses and enjoys a natural resource more than most other members of the public has standing . . . to challenge government actions that threaten that resource'” … .

Here, the petitioners failed to establish that they use and enjoy the portion of the park in the vicinity of the proposed location for the air stripper more than most other members of the public … . Matter of Brummel v Town of N. Hempstead Town Bd., 2016 NY Slip Op 08513, 2nd Dept 12-21-16

 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO CONSTRUCTION ON PARK LAND)/STATE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REVIEW ACT (SEQRA) (PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO CONSTRUCTION ON PARK LAND)/STANDING (ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, PETITIONERS DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO OBJECT TO CONSTRUCTION ON PARK LAND)

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