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TRANSFERS MADE WITHIN FIVE YEARS JUSTIFIED FIVE MONTH PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS.

The Third Department confirmed the determination of the Department of Health that petitioner was ineligible for Medicaid coverage for a period of five months based upon transfers of property made during the five-year look-back period:

“In reviewing a Medicaid eligibility determination rendered after a hearing, this Court must review the record, as a whole, to determine if the agency’s decisions are supported by substantial evidence and are not affected by an error of law” … . For purposes of determining Medicaid eligibility, “any transfer of an asset by the individual or the individual’s spouse for less than fair market value made within or after the look-back period shall render the individual ineligible for nursing facility services” for a period of time based on the amount transferred … . Such a transfer will not result in a penalty period where the applicant has made a satisfactory showing that the individual intended to dispose of the assets at fair market value or the assets were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for medical assistance … . The burden is on the applicant to demonstrate his or her eligibility for Medicaid by rebutting the “presumption that the transfer of funds was motivated, in part if not in whole, by . . . anticipation of a future need to qualify for medical assistance” … . …

Substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence” and “demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable” … . * * * We cannot say that respondents erred in rejecting [the] proof as inadequate and note that the Department of Social Services duly credited petitioner for expenses in which receipts were provided. Matter of Krajewski v Zucker, 2016 NY Slip Op 08287, 3rd Dept 12-8-16

MEDICAID (TRANSFERS MADE WITHIN FIVE YEARS JUSTIFIED FIVE MONTH PERIOD OF INELIGIBILITY FOR MEDICAID BENEFITS)

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