You are here: / / JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED...

JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED.

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the trial judge should have inquired further into the allegation of juror bias. One of defendant’s friends told the court two jurors were overheard referring to defendant as a scumbag during a recess:

“If at any time after the trial jury has been sworn and before the rendition of its verdict, . . . the court finds, from facts unknown at the time of the selection of the jury, that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case . . . the court must discharge such juror” (CPL 270.35 [1]). The standard for discharging a sworn juror is satisfied ” when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict’ ” … . There is a well-established framework by which the court must evaluate a sworn juror who, for one reason or another, may possess such a state of mind … .

To make a proper determination, the court “must question each allegedly unqualified juror individually in camera in the presence of the attorneys and defendant” (Buford, 69 NY2d at 299). “In a probing and tactful inquiry, the court should evaluate the nature of what the juror has seen, heard, or has acquired knowledge of, and assess its importance and its bearing on the case” (id.). During the inquiry, “the court should carefully consider the juror’s answers and demeanor to ascertain whether [his or] her state of mind will affect [his or] her deliberations” (id.). That accomplished, the court must place the reasons for its ruling on the record (see id.).

It has been emphasized repeatedly that ” each case must be evaluated on its unique facts’ ” … . To that end, the court must hold a Buford inquiry whenever there are facts indicating the possibility of juror bias, and must not base its ruling on speculation … . Not only does the court’s failure to hold an inquiry under such circumstances constitute reversible error, but its failure to place the reasons for its ruling on the record also constitutes reversible error … . Such errors are not subject to harmless error analysis … . People v Kuzdzal, 2016 NY Slip Op 07768, 4th Dept 11-18-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)/JURORS (CRIMINAL LAW, JUROR BIAS, JUDGE SHOULD HAVE MADE AN INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF JUROR BIAS BASED UPON AN OBSERVATION DURING A RECESS, NEW TRIAL ORDERED)

You might also like
HEARING NECESSARY ON MOTHER’S PETITION TO CHANGE THE SURNAME OF ONE OF THE CHILDREN, MATTER REMITTED.
Court Should Have Granted a Hearing on Defendant’s Motion to Vacate His Conviction on Ineffective-Assistance Grounds
SHIFTING BURDENS OF PROOF AT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STAGE IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS CLARIFIED; PRECEDENT TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD NO LONGER BE FOLLOWED; PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THEORIES OF LIABILITY REFUTED BY DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONSTITUTED AN ABANDONMENT OF THOSE THEORIES (FOURTH DEPT).
PLAINTIFF FELL WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO LEAVE A TRAILER THROUGH THE EXIT WHICH DID NOT HAVE A STAIRWAY ATTACHED, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240 (1) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FOURTH DEPT).
THE PLACEMENT OF THE LADDER WAS DEEMED THE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL AND PLAINTIFF HAD PLACED THE LADDER, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S ACTIONS WERE DEEMED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURY PRECLUDING RECOVERY IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1) CASE (FOURTH DEPT).
THE MOTION COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DEEMING PLAINTIFF’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ADMITTED BECAUSE DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT A COUNTER STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS (FOURTH DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH THE VICTIM, AFTER IDENTIFYING DEFENDANT IN A PHOTO ARRAY, ASKED TO SEE A SECOND PHOTO ARRAY, HER IDENTIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE; THERE WAS A STRONG DISSENT (FOURTH DEPT). ​
PLAINTIFF INJURED HIS BACK LIFTING A HEAVY METAL STRUCTURE A FEW INCHES TO ALLOW ROOFING MATERIAL TO BE PUT DOWN UNDERNEATH IT; THE INJURY WAS NOT THE RESULT OF AN ELEVATION-RELATED HAZARD COVERED BY LABOR LAW 240 (1) (FOURTH DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

CLAIMANT PRECLUDED FROM FURTHER WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR FAILURE... NOT ASKING A GRAND JURY TO CONSIDER A CHARGE FOR WHICH SOME EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED...