TRIAL JUDGE’S GRANT OF A TRIAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL IN THIS MURDER CASE WAS ERROR, HOWEVER THERE IS NO STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE PEOPLE’S APPEAL.
The Fourth Department determined the People did not have statutory authority to appeal the grant of a trial order of dismissal after a mistrial had been declared because the jury could not reach a verdict. The Fourth Department explicitly stated that it had reviewed the evidence and found it legally sufficient to support the charge (murder). The trial order of dismissal, then, should not have been granted. But there was no mechanism for the People to appeal the error:
“It is fundamental that in the absence of a statute expressly authorizing a criminal appeal, there is no right to appeal” … . CPL 450.20, the “exclusive route for a People’s appeal” … , does not authorize this appeal. Contrary to the People’s contention, CPL 450.20 (2) does not provide the statutory basis for this appeal, inasmuch as the order they seek to appeal did not set aside a guilty verdict and dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 290.10 (1) (b). Rather, there was no guilty verdict to set aside, and the order was issued pursuant to CPL 290.10 (1) (a). Thus, the order is not appealable … . We may not “create a right to appeal out of thin air” in order to address the merits “without trespassing on the Legislature’s domain and undermining the structure of article 450 of the CPL—the definite and particular enumeration of all appealable orders” … . Were we able to review the merits, however, we would agree with the People that the court erred in dismissing the indictment. A “review [of] the legal sufficiency of the evidence as defined by CPL 70.10 (1), [while] accepting the competent evidence as true, in the light most favorable to the People,” compels the conclusion that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the charge … . People v Tan, 2017 NY Slip Op 02541, 4th Dept 3-31-17