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Suppression Should Not Have Been Granted Because the Officer Who Made the Vehicle Stop Had Died/Hearsay Evidence from a Police Officer Who Arrived at the Scene After the Stop and Spoke to the Deceased Officer Was Admissible at the Suppression Hearing

The Second Department determined the hearsay testimony of a police officer (Schmidt) who learned of the reason for the stop of defendant’s vehicle from another officer (Olivieri) was admissible in the suppression hearing.  Supreme Court had suppressed the evidence stemming from the stop because the officer who made the stop (Olivieri) had died and could not therefore be “confronted” at the hearing:

Pursuant to statute, “hearsay evidence is admissible to establish any material fact” at a pretrial suppression hearing (CPL 710.60[4]…). Thus, “[a] police witness at a suppression hearing may establish probable cause by personal knowledge, as well as by information supplied by fellow officers” … . Where the knowledge of the imparting officer is based on his or her first-hand observations, the People are not required to produce that officer at the suppression hearing … .

Here, Schmidt’s testimony established that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was lawful, based upon the first-hand observations of Olivieri, which were imparted to Schmidt … . Probable cause for the defendant’s arrest also was established through Olivieri’s observations, as imparted to Schmidt, together with Schmidt’s own personal observations … .

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington (541 US 36) does not require a different result. In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered whether particular evidence admitted at trial violated the defendant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (see id. at 38…), and did not address the admission of hearsay evidence in pretrial suppression hearings … . People v Mitchell, 2015 NY Slip Op 00786, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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