You are here: / / Suppression Should Not Have Been Granted Because the Officer Who Made the...
,

Suppression Should Not Have Been Granted Because the Officer Who Made the Vehicle Stop Had Died/Hearsay Evidence from a Police Officer Who Arrived at the Scene After the Stop and Spoke to the Deceased Officer Was Admissible at the Suppression Hearing

The Second Department determined the hearsay testimony of a police officer (Schmidt) who learned of the reason for the stop of defendant’s vehicle from another officer (Olivieri) was admissible in the suppression hearing.  Supreme Court had suppressed the evidence stemming from the stop because the officer who made the stop (Olivieri) had died and could not therefore be “confronted” at the hearing:

Pursuant to statute, “hearsay evidence is admissible to establish any material fact” at a pretrial suppression hearing (CPL 710.60[4]…). Thus, “[a] police witness at a suppression hearing may establish probable cause by personal knowledge, as well as by information supplied by fellow officers” … . Where the knowledge of the imparting officer is based on his or her first-hand observations, the People are not required to produce that officer at the suppression hearing … .

Here, Schmidt’s testimony established that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was lawful, based upon the first-hand observations of Olivieri, which were imparted to Schmidt … . Probable cause for the defendant’s arrest also was established through Olivieri’s observations, as imparted to Schmidt, together with Schmidt’s own personal observations … .

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v Washington (541 US 36) does not require a different result. In Crawford, the Supreme Court considered whether particular evidence admitted at trial violated the defendant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (see id. at 38…), and did not address the admission of hearsay evidence in pretrial suppression hearings … . People v Mitchell, 2015 NY Slip Op 00786, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

You might also like
THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO PROVE DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WERE NOT BASED UPON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT ATTACH THE BUSINESS RECORDS RELIED UPON (SECOND DEPT).
Owner of Rental Vehicle May Be Liable Based Upon Failure to Maintain the Vehicle
Failure to Follow Statutory Procedure Re: Notes Sent Out By Jury Is a “Mode of Proceedings” Error Requiring Reversal
Late Motion to Amend Complaint Should Have Been Granted–No Showing of Prejudice
ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF CROSSED INTO DEFENDANT’S ONCOMING LANE TO PASS A MAIL TRUCK, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT; THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT REACTED REASONABLY TO AN EMERGENCY; TWO OTHER CARS HAD ENTERED DEFENDANT’S LANE TO GO AROUND THE TRUCK JUST BEFORE THE COLLISION (FOURTH DEPT).
Conviction for Which an Illegal Sentence Was Imposed Can Not Serve as the Basis for a Second-Felony-Offender Adjudication
THREE AND A HALF MONTH DELAY IN NOTIFYING THE INSURER OF THE LAWSUIT VIOLATED THE POLICY PROVISION REQUIRING NOTICE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE; THE DISCLAIMER MAILED 29 DAYS AFTER NOTICE OF THE SUIT WAS RECEIVED BY THE INSURER WAS TIMELY AND PRECLUDED SUIT AGAINST THE INSURER (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE LEASE WAS ENTERED INTO BY THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) THE OWNERS OF THE LLC SIGNED A PARAGRAPH AGREEING TO GUARANTEE THE PAYMENT OF THE RENT; THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL OWNERS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Shareholder Should Not Have Been Awarded Damages Individually Re: a Derivative... Question of Fact Whether Plaintiff-Employee Indicated Employer’s Sexual...