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FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE NOT MET. BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department determined the plaintiff bank failed to satisfy the foundation for the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The bank’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied. Although the affiant (Roesner) stated he was familiar with the successor-in-interest’s record keeping system, he did not allege he was familiar with the plaintiff bank’s record keeping practices and procedures:

Roesner averred, inter alia, that his knowledge of the relevant facts was based on his “examination of the financial books and business records made in the ordinary course of business maintained by or on behalf of the successor in interest to the Plaintiff,” and that he was “familiar with the record keeping systems that [the] successor in interest to the Plaintiff and/or its loan servicer use[d] to record and create information related to the residential mortgage loans that it services.” …

* * * On its motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing, by proof in admissible form, its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law … .

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate the admissibility of the records relied upon by Roesner under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]), and, thus, failed to establish the appellant’s default in payment under the note. “A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker’s business practices and procedures”… . Roesner, who was employed by the loan servicer …, did not allege that he was personally familiar with the plaintiff’s record keeping practices and procedures. Thus, Roesner failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of records concerning the appellant’s payment history… . HSBC Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Royal, 2016 NY Slip Op 05973, 2nd Dept 9-14-16

 

FORECLOSURE (FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE NOT MET. BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/EVIDENCE (FORECLOSURE. FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE NOT MET. BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO HEARSAY RULE, (FORECLOSURE. FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE NOT MET. BANK’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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