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NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS THE PERSON WITH THE SAME NAME.

The Second Department reversed defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction. Although there was proof a person with defendant’s name was part of the conspiracy, there was no proof defendant was that person:

We find that defendant Mohammed’s conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. In determining whether the jury’s verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence, the reviewing court must decide “whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial, and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crime charged” … , including the identity of the defendant who committed the crime charged … . While there was sufficient evidence to show that a person by the name of Habiyb Mohammed took part in the conspiracy, the record is devoid of any identification of defendant Mohammed to be that same Habiyb Mohammed. People v Brown, 2016 NY Slip Op 05940, 1st Dept 9-1-16

CRIMINAL LAW (NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS THE PERSON WITH THE SAME NAME)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, (NO PROOF DEFENDANT WAS THE PERSON WITH THE SAME NAME)

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