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MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE.

The Second Department, in an extensive decision covering several marital/separate property and equitable distribution issues not summarized here, determined the maintenance portion of a 1988 postnuptial agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable:

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that the maintenance provision of the 1988 postnuptial agreement, which provided the plaintiff with only $50,000 in full satisfaction of all claims, would be unconscionable by the time a final judgment would be entered in this action. At the time that the parties executed the 1988 postnuptial agreement, the defendant owned, among other things, a jewelry business worth at least $3 million, and he was in contract to buy a shopping center. Thereafter, during more than 25 years of marriage, the defendant’s jewelry business underwent tremendous growth while the plaintiff worked there, and the parties lived what can easily be described as a lavish lifestyle. Among other things, they owned numerous high-end automobiles and took numerous international vacations. For a time, they traveled regularly to the Bahamas on the defendant’s yacht. Under all the circumstances, the court properly determined that the maintenance provision in the 1988 agreement was unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable … . Maddaloni v Maddaloni, 2016 NY Slip Op 05851, 2nd Dept 8-24-16

FAMILY LAW (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE)/CONTRACT LAW (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSIONABLE)/UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT (MAINTENANCE PORTION OF POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENT UNCONSCIONABLE)

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