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UNTIMELY MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a motion to intervene in a foreclosure action was untimely and should have been dismissed. The potential intervenor (Shelepers) knew of the foreclosure action at the time the property was transferred to it but waited four months to bring the motion:

Intervention under CPLR 1012 and 1013 requires a timely motion … . Here, Shelepers purchased the subject property with the knowledge that this foreclosure action was pending, and yet it waited over four months before seeking leave to intervene. Under the circumstances of this case, Shelepers’ motion for leave to intervene in the action was untimely … . Castle Peak 2012-1 Loan Trust v Sattar, 2016 NY Slip Op 05111, 2nd Dept 6-29-16

CIVIL PROCEDURE (UNTIMELY MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)/INTERVENE, MOTION TO (UNTIMELY MOTION TO INTERVENE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED)

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