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CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

The Court of Appeals, over a three-judge dissent, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion (as a matter of law) when it denied defendant’s motion to present expert evidence about eyewitness identification. The Court of Appeals clarified how its precedent on the topic should be applied:

The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony concerning factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications rests within the sound discretion of the trial court … . When the motion is considered during the People’s case-in-chief, the trial court performs this function by weighing the request to introduce such testimony “against other relevant factors, such as the centrality of the identification issue and the existence of corroborating evidence” (… see … People v LeGrand, 8 NY3d 449, 459 [2007]). To the extent LeGrand has been understood to require courts to apply a strict two-part test that initially evaluates the strength of the corroborating evidence, it should instead be read as enumerating factors for trial courts to consider in determining whether expert testimony on eyewitness identification “‘would aid a lay jury in reaching a verdict'” … . Courts reviewing such a determination simply examine whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the “standard balancing test or prejudice versus probative value” … .

Here, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law when it precluded the introduction of the expert testimony. The trial court was entitled to reject the expert testimony after balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial or otherwise harmful effects. In light of the fact that “trial courts generally have the power to limit the amount and scope of evidence presented,” … on this record, the Appellate Division erred in holding that Supreme Court abused its discretion as a matter of law in precluding the testimony. People v McCullough, 2016 NY Slip Op 05060, CtApp 6-28-16

CRIMINAL LAW (CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION)/IDENTIFICATION (CRIMINAL LAW, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION)/EXPERT EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT EVIDENCE ON THE RELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION CLARIFIED; EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE HERE WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION)

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