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HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE.

The Second Department determined husband’s contribution to wife’s master’s degree was minimal. Therefore the award to the husband of 5% of the wife’s increased earning capacity was proper. The court explained the relevant law:

While the enhanced earnings of the defendant resulting from the Master’s degree and advanced certification she obtained during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution … , ” it is . . . incumbent upon the nontitled party seeking a distributive share of such assets to demonstrate that [he or she] made a substantial contribution to the titled party’s acquisition of that marital asset [and], [w]here only modest contributions are made by the nontitled spouse toward the other spouse’s attainment of a degree or professional license, and the attainment is more directly the result of the titled spouse’s own ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of that enhanced earning capacity'” … . Here, since the plaintiff’s contributions to the defendant’s acquisition of her degree and advanced certification were minimal, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding him only five percent of the value of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity … . Taylor v Taylor, 2016 NY Slip Op 04705, 2nd Dept 6-15-16

 

FAMILY LAW (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)/EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)/ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY (HUSBAND ENTITLED TO ONLY FIVE PERCENT OF WIFE’S ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY FROM WIFE’S MASTER’S DEGREE OBTAINED DURING MARRIAGE)

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