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You are here: Home1 / Criminal Law2 / 33 HOUR DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT, UNDER THE FACTS, DID NOT RENDER STATEMENT...
Criminal Law, Evidence

33 HOUR DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT, UNDER THE FACTS, DID NOT RENDER STATEMENT INVOLUNTARILY MADE.

The Second Department, in affirming defendant’s conviction over a dissent, determined a 33 hour delay of arraignment did not, under the facts, render defendant’s statement involuntarily made:

… [T]he testimony at the suppression hearing demonstrated that approximately 29-33 hours passed between the defendant’s arrest and his arraignment and that he provided statements after being in custody for approximately 25-28 hours. … [T]his was not a typical armed robbery case, and … the delay in arraignment was satisfactorily explained. The NYPD coordinated with three other law enforcement agencies to investigate not only the attempted murder and two robbery charges, but also the extent to which the defendant used false identities and counterfeit money in various jurisdictions, before presenting these matters at arraignment, where a judge would be considering the likelihood that the defendant would return to court before setting bail. Notably, prior to obtaining a statement from the defendant, the lead detective traveled to the hospital where the victim was recovering, conducted a photo array identification procedure when the victim became available, and then traveled back to the station house. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the delay in arraigning the defendant was attributable to a thorough and necessary police investigation. Thus, his “detention [was not] prolonged beyond a time reasonably necessary to accomplish the tasks required to bring [him] to arraignment” … . Further, the record does not otherwise demonstrate that the police unnecessarily delayed the arraignment in order to obtain an involuntary confession … . People v Johnson, 2016 NY Slip Op 03896, 2nd Dept 5-18-16

CRIMINAL LAW (33 HOUR DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT, UNDER THE FACTS, DID NOT RENDER STATEMENT INVOLUNTARILY MADE)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, 33 HOUR DELAY IN ARRAIGNMENT, UNDER THE FACTS, DID NOT RENDER STATEMENT INVOLUNTARILY MADE)

May 18, 2016
Tags: Second Department
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