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SEARCH OF BRIEFCASE FOUND NEAR DEFENDANT UPON ARREST WAS NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY FOUND IN THE BRIEFCASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.

 

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were no exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of a briefcase found on a parked car near where defendant was arrested. Defendant was identified by a store clerk as the person who had just robbed him at gunpoint and a loaded gun was found on defendant’s person upon arrest:

Because “[a]ll warrantless searches presumptively are unreasonable per se, . . . [w]here a warrant has not been obtained, it is the People who have the burden of overcoming this presumption of unreasonableness” … . Under the New York State Constitution, an individual’s right of privacy in his or her personal effects dictates that a warrantless search incident to arrest be deemed unreasonable unless (1) it satisfies certain “spatial and temporal limitations to ensure that the search is not significantly divorced in time or place from the arrest” and (2) it is justified by the presence of exigent circumstances … . “Exigency must be affirmatively demonstrated” … . Exigent circumstances may be established by a showing that the search was necessary to ensure the safety of the public or the arresting officer, or that it was necessary to prevent the destruction or concealment of evidence … .

Contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the search of the briefcase was not justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The People failed to present evidence establishing exigent circumstances at the time of the arrest that would justify the search. The arresting officer did not claim that he searched the briefcase out of concern for the safety of himself or the public and, in any event, the circumstances did not support a reasonable belief that the briefcase contained a weapon … . Additionally, the officer did not claim that he searched the briefcase to prevent the defendant from destroying evidence and, in any event, the facts do not support such a claim. Moreover, despite the People’s contention to the contrary, the error was not harmless, as it cannot be said that there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant of robbery in the first degree had it not been for the error … . People v Houston, 2016 NY Slip Op 06510, 2nd Dept 10-5-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (SEARCH OF BRIEFCASE FOUND NEAR DEFENDANT UPON ARREST WAS NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY FOUND IN THE BRIEFCASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/EVIDENCE (CRIMINAL LAW, SEARCH OF BRIEFCASE FOUND NEAR DEFENDANT UPON ARREST WAS NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY FOUND IN THE BRIEFCASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)/SUPPRESSION (SEARCH OF BRIEFCASE FOUND NEAR DEFENDANT UPON ARREST WAS NOT A VALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST AND WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES; EVIDENCE OF ROBBERY FOUND IN THE BRIEFCASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED)

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