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LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants’ “law office failure” excuse was sufficient to warrant granting the motion to vacate the default judgments:

“A party seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), and thereupon to serve a late answer, must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action”… . The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the exercise of that discretion, the court may accept law office failure as an excuse (see CPLR 2005… ). Here, the defaulting defendants demonstrated a reasonable excuse, based upon law office failure arising from a miscommunication between their former counsel and their present counsel, for their default in answering the complaint or otherwise appearing in the action … .

The defaulting defendants also demonstrated that they had a potentially meritorious defense. …

Under the circumstances here, particularly in light of the evidence that the defaulting defendants’ delay was not willful, the lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs resulting from the defaulting defendants’ short delay in appearing and seeking to answer the complaint, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the strong public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defaulting defendants’ motion to vacate their default and to compel the plaintiffs to accept their late answer … . Government Employees Ins. Co. v Avenue C Med., P.C., 2018 NY Slip Op 08010, Second Dept 11-21-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (VACATE DEFAULT, LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/DEFAULT JUDGMENT, MOTION TO VACATE (LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/LAW OFFICE FAILURE (VACATE DEFAULT, LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 5015, CPLR 2005 (VACATE DEFAULT, LAW OFFICE FAILURE EXCUSE WAS SUFFICIENT TO WARRANT GRANTING OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO VACATE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

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