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TRIAL JUDGE’S FAILURE TO WARN DEFENDANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR BEFORE REMOVING DEFENDANT FROM THE COURTROOM WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The Second Department reversed defendant's conviction because the trial judge did not first warn defendant about the consequences of disruptive behavior before removing defendant from the courtroom:

 

CPL 260.20 provides, in relevant part, “that a defendant who conducts himself in so disorderly and disruptive a manner that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom may be removed from the courtroom if, after he has been warned by the court that he will be removed if he continues such conduct, he continues to engage in such conduct.”

In the present case, the trial court erred in removing the defendant from the courtroom without first warning him that he would be removed if he continued his disruptive behavior … . Contrary to the People's contention, the court's statement to the court officer that, “If he speaks again, officer, do what you need to do,” did not constitute a sufficient warning. This statement was not directed to the defendant, and failed to adequately inform him of the “potential consequences which might result from his continued disruptive behavior” … . Furthermore, while the defendant's conduct was clearly disruptive, it was not violent in nature, and did not “create[ ] an emergency necessitating his immediate removal” where “the court had no practical opportunity to issue a verbal warning that [the] defendant would be removed if he continued to engage in such conduct” … . People v Burton, 2016 NY Slip Op 02847, 2nd Dept 4-13-16


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