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RIGHT TO PARTITION IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND IS SUBJECT TO THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiff summary judgment in a partition action without holding a hearing. The right to partition is not absolute and the remedy is subject to the equities between the parties:

“A person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or tenant in common, in which he [or she] has an estate of inheritance, or for life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made without great prejudice to the owners (RPAPL 901[1]). The right to partition is not absolute, however, and while a tenant in common has the right to maintain an action for partition pursuant to RPAPL 901, the remedy is always subject to the equities between the parties” … . Here, the Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged the above when it stated in its … order that the parties were directed to appear for a conference “for purposes of finding a date for a trial of the issue of existence of equitable defenses to plaintiff's request for partition.” Guo v Guo, 2016 NY Slip Op 01806, 2nd Dept 3-16-16

REAL PROPERTY (RIGHT TO PARTITION IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND IS SUBJECT TO THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES)/PARTITION (REAL PROPERTY, RIGHT TO PARTITION IS NOT ABSOLUTE AND IS SUBJECT TO THE EQUITIES BETWEEN THE PARTIES)

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