You are here: / / PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY, SUPPRESSION...
,

PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY, SUPPRESSION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Fahey, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not apply and defendant’s suppression motion should have been granted. Defendant walked in to a hospital with a gun shot wound and the police were notified. When the police officer arrived, defendant’s clothes were in a clear plastic bag on the floor. The officer examined the clothes and concluded defendant had shot himself with a gun which had been in his waistband. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon. The Court of Appeals concluded one of the conditions of the plain-view warrant-exception had not been met by the evidence in the record, i.e., there was no showing the incriminating nature of the clothes was immediately apparent to the officer:

 

“Under the plain view doctrine, if the sight of an object gives the police probable cause to believe that it is the instrumentality of a crime, the object may be seized without a warrant if three conditions are met: (1) the police are lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed; (2) the police have lawful access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent” … .

Against this backdrop we conclude that the hearing court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the clothes seized by police. There was evidence adduced at the suppression hearing that the officer who seized the clothes knew defendant to have been shot, and that defendant awaited treatment at the hospital while dressed in clothes different from those he wore at the time of the shooting. More important, however, is what the evidence presented at the suppression hearing does not establish. That evidence does not show that, before the seizure, the testifying officer knew that entry and exit wounds were located on an area of defendant’s body that would have been covered by the clothes defendant wore at the time of the shooting. Similarly, the record of that proceeding contains no other indicium that could have given rise to a reasonable belief that the shooting had affected defendant’s clothes. To that end, there is no record support for the lower courts’ conclusion that the investigating officer had probable cause to believe that defendant’s clothes were the instrumentality of a crime … . People v Sanders, 2016 NY Slip Op 01255, CtApp 2-23-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY)/SUPPRESSION (PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREDMENT DID NOT APPLY)/PLAIN VIEW (EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY)/SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT DID NOT APPLY)

You might also like
Gabriela A’s Actions Constituted Disobedience Under PINS Criteria, Not Criminal Actions (Resisting Arrest/Obstruction of Governmental Administration) Under Juvenile Delinquency Criteria
Evidence of Prior Violent Act by Defendant Properly Admitted to Refute “Extreme Emotional Disturbance” Affirmative Defense
WHETHER THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE WAS VALID PRESENTED A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND WAS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP).
Attorney Conflict Waiver Criteria Discussed/Whether Molineux Analysis Should Be Applied to “Prior Bad Thoughts” in Journal Entries Discussed
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE’S RULE PROHIBITING DEPARTMENT INSPECTORS FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION OF FREE SPEECH (CT APP).
DEFENDANT APPEARED IN COURT WITH A SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL WHO INFORMED THE COURT ANOTHER LEGAL AID LAWYER WAS BEING ASSIGNED TO DEFENDANT’S CASE; DEFENDANT WAS NOT “WITHOUT COUNSEL” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPL 30.30; THE ASSOCIATED SPEEDY-TRIAL TIME-PERIOD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO THE PEOPLE, NOT THE DEFENDANT (CT APP). ​
THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES CONTRACTS PROVIDED FOR THE SOLE REMEDY OF CURE AND REPURCHASE, PLAINTIFF TRUSTEE’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR GENERAL CONTRACT DAMAGES DISMISSED (CT APP).
THE MAJORITY CONCLUDED (1) THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST FOR COUNSEL, AND (2) WHETHER A REQUEST FOR COUNSEL IS UNEQUIVOCAL IS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS (CT APP). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

AN ADEQUATE WAIVER OF APPELLATE RIGHTS AT SENTENCING DOES NOT REMEDY AN INADEQUATE... QUESTIONS OF FACT HAD BEEN RAISED IN PLAINTIFF’S MALICIOUS PROSECUTION...