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POLICE OFFICER’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

The Fourth Department determined plaintiff police officer had stated causes of action for unlawful discrimination based upon a disability under the Human Rights Law and the federal Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff was arrested for DWI and entered a rehabilitation program where he was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from his work in New York City after the 9-11 attack. Plaintiff was terminated upon completion of the rehabilitation program. The city argued his termination was based on the DWI, but plaintiff alleged other officers, who were not disabled, were not terminated after committing a criminal offense. The Fourth Department noted that when the plaintiff’s and defendant’s arguments are equally supported, plaintiff must prevail in a motion to dismiss:

 

Plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for disability discrimination under the Human Rights Law by alleging that: he has a disability and is therefore a member of a protected class; he is qualified for his position; he suffered an adverse employment action, i.e., termination of his employment; and the termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination … . Similarly, plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action for discriminatory termination under the Rehabilitation Act by alleging that: “(1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the job; (3) he was terminated solely because of his disability; and (4) the program or activity receives federal funds” … . …

In support of those causes of action, plaintiff alleged that the City did not terminate the employment of two nondisabled employees after they were arrested for criminal misconduct, thus raising an inference that his termination was based upon his disability. The court stated in its decision that plaintiff’s allegations “equally support” the conclusions that those two employees and plaintiff were similarly situated, and that they were not similarly situated. On the motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), however, facts that equally support opposing inferences must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor … . Regan v City of Geneva, 2016 NY Slip Op 01101, 4th Dept 2-11-16

 

EMPLOYMENT LAW (DISABILITY [PTSD] DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (DISABILITY [PTSD] DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/REHABILITATION ACT (DISABILITY [PTSD] DISCRIMINATION CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)/CIVIL PROCEDURE (WHEN THE ALLEGATIONS OF BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY SUPPORTED, PLAINTIFF MUST PREVAIL IN A MOTION TO DISMISS)/MUNICIPAL LAW (POLICE OFFICERS CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DISABILITY [PTSD] DISCRIMINATION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)POLICE OFFICERS (OFFICER’S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR DISABILITY [PTSD] DISCRIMINATION SHOULD HAVE SURVIVED MOTION TO DISMISS)

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