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Disposing of Key Evidence Warranted Striking of Answer

The Second Department determined Supreme Court properly struck the defendant’s answer and awarded summary judgment to plaintiffs on liability because the defendant disposed of crucial evidence after having been asked to preserve it.  Students were directed to stand on a grate to pose for a class picture.  The grate collapsed and the students fell eleven feet.  The defendant disposed of the grate:

Under the common-law doctrine of spoliation, when a party negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence, that party may be sanctioned under CPLR 3126 … . Since the Supreme Court has broad discretion in determining what, if any, sanction should be imposed for spoliation of evidence …, it may, under appropriate circumstances, impose a sanction even if the destruction occurred through negligence rather than wilfulness, and even if the evidence was destroyed before the spoliator became a party, provided the spoliator was on notice that the evidence might be needed for future litigation … .

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in striking the defendant’s answers and thereupon awarding the plaintiffs summary judgment on the issue of liability pursuant to CPLR 3126. The record demonstrates that the defendant disposed of the grate involved in the accident after having received a written demand from one of the infant plaintiff’s attorneys that the grate be preserved for inspection by the plaintiffs and their experts. Moreover, the plaintiffs demonstrated that they were unduly prejudiced by the defendant’s conduct in disposing of the grate. Biniachvili v Yeshivat Shaare Torah Inc, 2014 NY Slip Op 05826, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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