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HOSPITAL DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO MEDICAL-PEER-REVIEW AND COMMON-INTEREST QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE RE: COMMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE TERMINATION OF PLAINITFF-PHYSICIAN’S HOSPITAL PRIVILEGES.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant hospital and administrators were entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s defamation complaint. Plaintiff was a physician with privileges at defendant hospital. Based upon complaints about plaintiff’s behavior, the hospital terminated plaintiff’s hospital privileges pursuant to a recommendation of the hospital’s credentials committee. The statements at issue were made before, during and after the administrative proceedings at the hospital. The Second Department determined the defendants were not entitled to absolute privilege for comments made during the meeting of the credentials committee because those proceedings were not judicial or quasi-judicial in nature. However, the defendants were entitled to qualified privilege for medical peer review proceedings pursuant to 42 USC 1111. With respect to comments made both prior to and during the meeting of the credentials committee, the Second Department found that a “qualified privilege of common interest” applied. The Second Department rejected Supreme Court’s finding that plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether the defendants acted with malice (which would have removed the qualified privilege). With respect to comments made after the termination of plaintiff’s hospital privileges, the Second Department found, based upon plaintiff’s public comments, plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure and there was no showing defendants’ post-termination comments were made with actual malice.  Concerning the two types of qualified privilege which were found applicable, the court explained:

 

The defendants established, prima facie, that they were entitled to a qualified privilege under 42 USC § 11111(a), part of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, which creates a qualified privilege for information provided in medical peer review proceedings concerning the competence or professional conduct of a physician, “unless such information is false and the person providing it knew that such information was false” (42 USC § 11111[a][2]…)

* * * With respect to [the] causes of action … predicated upon allegedly defamatory statements made both during and prior to the Credentials Committee meeting, the defendants established, prima facie, that they were entitled to a qualified privilege of common interest … , under state statutory law (see Public Health Law §§ 2805-j[2]; 2805-m[3]; Education Law § 6527[3], [5]), and under [the hospital’s] bylaws … . Colantonio v Mercy Med. Ctr., 2016 NY Slip Op 00147, 2nd Dept 1-13-16

 

DEFAMATION (MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND COMMON INTEREST QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE APPLIED TO COMMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION OF TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF’S HOSPITAL PRVILEGES)/QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION, MEDICAL PEER REVIEW AND COMMON INTEREST QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE APPLIED TO COMMENTS MADE IN CONNECTION OF TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF’S HOSPITAL PRVILEGES)/MEDICAL PEER REVIEW QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION)/COMMON INTEREST QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE (DEFAMATION)

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