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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT-CONTRACTOR LAUNCHED AN INSTRUMENT OF HARM AND WHETHER THERE WAS AN INTERVENING, SUPERSEDING CAUSE OF THE INJURY, CRITERIA FOR BOTH EXPLAINED.

The Third Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant-contractor’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted. Defendant contracted with the NYS Department of Transportation (DOT) to do roadwork. Plaintiff alleged the roadwork caused the car in which he was a passenger to go airborne. The Third Department found that the alleged excessive speed attributed to the driver of the car was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. Therefore, there was a question of fact whether the speed was the superseding cause of the accident. The court explained the law re: tort liability to third persons arising from contract, and an intervening, superseding cause of injury:

 

… “[A] party who enters into a contract to render services may be said to have assumed a duty of care — and thus be potentially liable in tort — to third persons: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his [or her] duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties[;] and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party’s duty to maintain the premises safely” … . “The general rule is that ‘[a] builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the plans and specifications which he [or she] has contracted to follow unless they are so apparently defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put upon notice that the work was dangerous and likely to cause injury'” * * *

… “[W]here the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence. If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of or far removed from the defendant’s conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal nexus” … . Whether an intervening act is a superseding cause is generally a question of fact, but there are circumstances where it may be determined as a matter of law … . Dunham v Ketco, Inc., 2016 NY Slip Op 00082, 3rd Dept 1-7-16

 

 

 

 

 

 

NEGLIGENCE (THEORIES NOT FAIRLY IMPLIED FROM NOTICE OF CLAIM CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS)/NOTICE OF CLAIM (THEORIES NOT FAIRLY IMPLIED FROM NOTICE OF CLAIM CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN SUPPLEMENTAL BILL OF PARTICULARS)/BILL OF PARTICULARS (CANNOT BE SUPPLEMENTED TO INCLUDE THEORIES NOT FAIRLY IMPLIED FROM NOTICE OF CLAIM)/MUNICIPAL LAW (BILL OF PARTICULARS CANNOT BE SUPPLEMENTED TO INCLUDE THEORIES NOT FAIRLY IMPLIED FROM NOTICE OF CLAIM)

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