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FINAL ORDERS OF PROTECTION ISSUED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION WITHOUT FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURE REQUIRED BY FAMILY COURT ACT 154-c VACATED.

The Third Department determined Family Court did not follow the statutory procedure for issuing final orders of protection. Although a court may issue a temporary order of protection on its own motion without following the procedure, it may not do so for final orders:

 

… Family Ct Act § 154-c (3) provides, in relevant part: “No order of protection may direct any party to observe conditions of behavior unless: (i) the party requesting the order of protection has served and filed a petition or counter-claim in accordance with article four, five, six or eight of this act and, (ii) the court has made a finding on the record that such party is entitled to issuance of the order of protection which may result from a judicial finding of fact, judicial acceptance of an admission by the party against whom the order was issued or judicial finding that the party against whom the order is issued has given knowing, intelligent and voluntary consent to its issuance” (emphasis added). Although a Family Court can issue a temporary order of protection on its own motion and, in so doing, it would “not [be] required to follow all of the ordinary procedural requirements” (… see Family Ct Act § 828 [1] [a]), where, as here, the court enters a final order of protection, it is required to observe the procedural steps set forth in Family Ct Act § 154-c (3) … . Indeed, Family Ct Act § 154-c (3) was amended in 1998 “to incorporate, explicitly, federal minimum due-process requirements regarding judicial findings as a prerequisite to issuing orders of protection, to ensure that such orders are given full faith and credit by courts of other jurisdictions” …

Here, although there was an exchange of proposed terms for mutual orders of protection, the mother clearly indicated that she did not consent to the orders containing the terms that Family Court ultimately adopted on its own motion or admit any pertinent allegations set forth in the father’s family offense petition … . Nor did Family Court conduct an examination of the factual basis of the parties’ family offense petitions or make a finding that the terms objected to by the mother were “reasonably necessary” to protect the parties or their children … . Matter of Daniel W. v Kimberly W., 2016 NY Slip Op 00070, 3rd Dept 1-7-16

 

FAMILY LAW (FINAL ORDERS OF PROTECTION ISSUED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION WITHOUT FOLLOWING STATUTORY PROCEDURE VACATED)/ORDERS OF PROTECTION (FAMILY COURT, FINAL ORDERS OF PROTECTION ISSUED ON THE COURT’S OWN MOTION WITHOUT FOLLOWING STATUTORY PROCEDURE VACATED)

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