You are here: / / MARITAL PRIVILEGE DID NOT APPLY TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THAT HE...
,

MARITAL PRIVILEGE DID NOT APPLY TO DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT THAT HE WAS GOING TO BURN THE HOUSE DOWN.

In an arson case, the Third Department determined County Court properly allowed defendant’s wife to testify defendant said he was going to burn the house down. The court explained the limits of marital privilege:

The privilege that precludes a spouse from disclosing a confidential communication made during marriage by the other spouse (see CPLR 4502 [b]; CPL 60.10) does not protect every remark between spouses during a marriage. Instead, “the privilege attaches only to those statements made in confidence and ‘that are induced by the marital relation and prompted by the affection, confidence and loyalty engendered by such relationship'” … . The wife testified that her marriage to defendant began to deteriorate during the months before the fire, in part because defendant wanted to relocate to Colorado while the wife wanted to remain in New York and continue living in the marital home with her children. She stated that, as the relationship worsened, defendant told her “many” times that he would burn the house down to prevent her from taking possession of it when they separated.

The privilege “was never designed to forbid inquiry into the personal wrongs committed by one spouse against the other” and, thus, does not apply here, as defendant’s statements were not prompted by trust or confidence in the marital relationship, but, instead, constituted threats of criminal activity directed at the wife … . Further, the privilege does not apply “when the substance of a communication . . . is revealed to third parties” … . Here, the wife testified that several of defendant’s threats were made in the presence of other people, including mutual friends and the couple’s children, and these statements were not privileged … . People v Howard, 2015 NY Slip Op 08870, 3rd Dept 12-3-15

CRIMINAL LAW (MARITAL PRIVILEGE)/EVIDENCE (MARITAL PRIVILEGE, CRIMINAL TRIAL)

You might also like
Statements Made by Defendant During First 15 Hours of a 60-Hour Interrogation Not Coerced
BASED UPON EXECUTIVE LAW 63 AND TWO EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED BY GOVERNOR CUOMO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS THE AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATE AND CHARGE PERJURY ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY A DISTRICT ATTORNEY BEFORE A GRAND JURY CONVENED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO INVESTIGATE THE POLICE SHOOTING OF AN UNARMED CIVILIAN (THIRD DEPT).
It May Be an Abuse of Discretion for the Board to Refuse to Review an Untimely Application Raising a Jurisdictional Issue/Board May Be Barred from Reopening a Closed Claim More than Seven Years After the Accident
Court Review of Elimination of Pension Benefits Proper Even though the Administrative Hearing Had Not Yet Been Held—No Need to Exhaust Administrative Remedies Where the Petition Does Not Raise an Issue of Fact that Should Initially Be Determined in the Administrative Hearing
Suppressed Statement Improperly Allowed to Be Used to Impeach Defendant—Defendant Did Not Open the Door for Use of the Statement by Contradicting It On Direct
No Determinate Sentences for Youthful Offenders 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ELIMINATION OF POSITION WAS DONE IN BAD FAITH; NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF OPEN MEETINGS LAW DID NOT INVALIDATE TOWN’S ACTIONS.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE PROOF AT TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENSE OPENED THE DOOR TO ALLOW EVIDENCE OF OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONIAL... FAILURE TO CLARIFY WHETHER APPEAL WAIVER WAS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT RENDERED...