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Carrier’s Waiver of Lien on Third-Party Settlement Is Not “Compensation” Upon Which an Award of Attorneys Fees Can Be Based

The Third Department determined the negotiation of a waiver of the carrier’s lien on a third-party settlement was not “compensation” upon which an award of attorneys fees can be based:

Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 24, counsel fees approved by the Board “shall become a lien upon the compensation awarded” and compensation is defined as “the money allowance payable to an employee or to his [or her] dependents as provided for in this chapter” (Workers’ Compensation Law § 2 [6]). Claimant contends that the carrier’s waiver of its lien against the third-party settlement is equivalent to a payment of compensation and counsel fees based upon services provided in securing the waiver should be approved. While “the term ‘compensation’ should be liberally construed to advance the interest of injured employees” …, we find no abuse of the Board’s discretion in its finding that a waiver by a workers’ compensation carrier of a lien against a third-party recovery is not compensation within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law … . Although claimant does benefit from the waiver of the lien, the benefit derived relates to the third-party proceeds and not to compensation awarded him under the Workers’ Compensation Law. Accordingly, the Board’s refusal to award counsel fees will not be disturbed. Matter of Pickering v Car Win Constr., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 08484, 3rd Dept 11-19-15

 

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